Surf at Your Own Risk: For the First Time in New Jersey, Judge Holds Juror In Contempt for Internet Use During Deliberations

Last month, the Hon. Peter E. Doyne, A.J.S.C. found jury foreperson Daniel M. Kaminsky to be in criminal contempt pursuant to R. 1:10-2 for violating several orders of the trial judge that prohibited jurors from engaging in any independent research during trial as set forth in In re Kaminsky, (N.J. Sup. Ct., Bergen County, Mar. 12, 2012). After a mistrial was declared in the underlying criminal drug case and two fellow jurors reported Kaminsky’s Internet use, the Court found beyond a reasonable doubt, in the context of an Order to Show Cause hearing and related in camera proceedings, that (1) Kaminsky conducted independent research; (2) the act was contemptuous; and (3) the conduct was willful and contumacious, “with a complete disregard of the court’s authority and instructions.” Although the foreperson was subject to a maximum punishment of six months in prison, a $1,000 fine or both, he was only fined $500.

During the proceedings, the jury was repeatedly advised that Internet and other independent research was prohibited because their deliberations and the verdict should be based solely on the evidence introduced in the courtroom. They were informed of the prohibition during the voir dire process, after being sworn, before each break, and at the end of the day. Nonetheless, during the deliberation phase, the jury foreperson researched the defendant's potential punishment on the Internet, concluding that the penalty could range from ten to twenty years. He found this result to be particularly severe because the defendant was a young man, to the point that the foreperson became physically sick and very emotional at the thought of the defendant be subjected to a long incarceration.

One of the jurors who reported the foreperson felt he had become “tainted” because his independent research concerning the potential penalty drove his deliberations and likely influenced two other jurors. The Court concluded that the foreperson had not researched the specifics of the case at issue was of no moment. Similarly, that the trial judge did not specifically “elucidate every single possible subject which a juror is prohibited from researching” was not relevant. The critical fact was that the foreperson was relying on information that was not admitted as evidence, thereby disobeying the Court’s instructions.

Judge Doyne acknowledged that in New Jersey the “sanctioning of a juror who has violated a jury instruction to refrain from independent research, generally by way of the internet, appears to be absent.” This improper research, however, was not a novel issue for this particular Judge. Click here for a prior blog post regarding Judge Doyne. Nor, as we have previously discussed, is it a unique phenomenon. (For reasons why social media seems to be improperly perceived differently from other traditional means of communication, click here.) Ultimately, Judge Doyne was concerned that there exists the greater problem of general juror disobedience and the failure of some jurors to “conscientiously discharge their duties.” At the same time, he made clear how much he valued the courage and honesty of the two jurors who reported the foreperson. He also emphasized that that the foreperson did not have evil or malevolent intentions. It is clear from this opinion and his prior experience that the Judge did not want to attack jurors and respects their essential functions. Rather, he recommended here, as he had before, that the State’s Model Criminal Jury Charges be revised “to better communicate the importance of obedience to the court’s instructions,” including an explanation of the “reasons for the prohibition on juror research” as well as the “possible punishments for disobedience.”

Will revising the State’s Model Criminal Jury Charges eradicate all instances of jurors conducting research on the Internet? Given the prevalence of such conduct, probably not. But as Judge Doyne noted, jurors generally “possess sufficient discipline, patience, and sense of civic duty” to obey court directives. Thus, if the importance of those directives is clearly conveyed, we will hopefully see a decline in the objectionable behavior and an accompanying improvement in the jury trial system.

E-SIN: Court Orders Identification of Suspected Porn Pirates

“Anonymous” copyright infringers -- in this case the downloaders of a pornographic video -- should take note of a recent decision. In what is becoming increasingly common, a court was recently asked by a copyright holder to issue an order requiring non-party Internet Service Providers (“ISP”) to identify individual Internet users for purposes of filing a copyright lawsuit against them pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.

In Digital Sin, Inc. v. John Does 1-176, 12-cv-00176 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 30, 2012), Plaintiff, a producer of digital porn, in this case “My Little Panties #2,” sought and obtained Internet Protocol (“IP”) addresses from which their video had been illegally downloaded and shared by a “swarm” or group of interacting users -- 176 IP addresses in all. After filing suit against 176 John Doe defendants in the Southern District of New York, Digital Sin filed a motion for expedited discovery, seeking access from the ISPs to the names as well as the e-mail, physical and Media Access Control addresses of the individuals connected to those IP addresses.

District Judge Alison J. Nathan found “good cause” for Digital Sin’s request under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d) and (f) to issue pre-meet and confer Rule 45 subpoenas so as to avoid the federal law, 47 U.S.C. § 551(c), barring ISPs from disclosing the identities of putative defendants without a court order. Judge Nathan determined that expedited discovery was necessary to prevent the requested data from being lost as a part of the routine deletions by ISPs.

However, due to the sensitive nature of the matter and the potential for annoyance and embarrassment of the identified individuals (many of whom may not even have been the ones that actually downloaded and shared the pornographic video), the Court also issued a protective order allowing the putative defendants and ISPs to be heard before information could be revealed to Digital Sin. Specifically, the Court ordered that the ISPs were prohibited from producing the Doe Defendants’ identifying information before the expiration of a 60-day period during which the John Does could move to quash the subpoena. In an unusual twist, the Court also allowed anyone who moved to quash or modify the subpoena to proceed anonymously if they wished.

There are at least two important take aways from the Digital Sin decision. First, courts will not hesitate to order non-parties to disclose electronic information that is relevant to the litigation at hand, including for purposes of identifying putative defendants who may have broken the law. Second, depending on the subject matter, courts will also be sensitive to the risk of mis-identification or misuse of such information and will therefore attempt to minimize any potential harm to innocent parties.


Paul E. Asfendis is a Director on the Gibbons E-Discovery Task Force.

Still No Cure for the Malady of Jurors' Social Media Use During Trials and Deliberations

Having recognized the challenges regarding jurors’ use of social media in the courtroom, the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management requested that the Federal Judicial Center (“FJC”) survey district court judges to identify effective mechanisms to curtail this growing problem. In response, the FJC queried 952 district judges and issued Jurors’ Use of Media During Trials and Deliberations, which demonstrates that despite the various strategies devised, it is virtually impossible to prevent jurors’ use of social media and is equally difficult to detect each and every impropriety. This issue is not novel; in fact, this blog has previously reported on instances where jurors’ use of social media had a significant impact on a proceeding as well as suggestions on how to avoid such pitfalls. Click here for those postings.

The General Response

Of the 508 judges who responded to the electronic questionnaire at issue, only 30 judges or 6% reported detecting jurors’ use of social media. This discovery occurred more often during trials rather than deliberations and in criminal trials than civil trials. The social media at issue in these instances were Facebook, Google, instant messaging (“IM”) services, Twitter, Internet chat rooms, Internet bulletin boards, and MySpace.

Nature of the Use

Among the jurists who identified how jurors used social media during trial and deliberations, the most common was through jurors’ “friending” or attempting to “friend” participants in the case (meaning witnesses, parties, attorneys or judges) as well as communicating or attempting to communicate directly with participants. In addition, the judges discovered that jurors used social media to reveal parts of the deliberative process; provide information about other jurors; conduct research; generally share information about the case by, for example, revealing the likely verdict; allow someone else to hear live testimony; and conduct personal business.

Challenges with and Consequences of Detection

Of the 28 judges who indicated how they learned of a juror’s improper use of social media, the most common sources of that discovery were fellow jurors, attorneys or information learned in post-trial motions or interviews. Judges also learned of the malfeasance through court personnel or a party. Most notable is the fact that in only two instances did judges report personally observing jurors utilizing electronic devices in the courtroom. Upon learning of such improprieties, those judges have removed the juror, cautioned the juror about removal, declared a mistrial, held the juror in contempt, fined the juror, questioned the juror and/or held a hearing to determine the scope and nature of information shared.

Strategies for Preventing Jurors’ Use of Social Media Solutions

Fortunately, the majority of the judges who responded to the questionnaire have taken measures to prevent jurors from using social media during trial and/or deliberations, though surprisingly, 30 judges (6%) admitted not specifically addressing the issue with jurors. To prevent use of this media, judges have employed model jury instructions; reminded jurors during voir dire and through various points in the trial of the prohibition and the rationale behind it; confiscated phones and electronic devices during deliberation and/or at the start of each day of trial; articulated potential consequences of disobeying instructions; and/or required jurors to sign a certifications or statements promising not to use social media while serving on a jury or that they adhered to the instructions.

How do we know what, if any of those procedures are effective? The answer is we don’t. As conceded by almost half the jurists who responded to questions about preventive measures and whether they were effective, they simply do not know whether the steps taken were successful. In the meantime, while recognizing there is no panacea, judges, attorneys and fellow jurors must police the use of social media by jurors during trials and deliberations.

Ooops, They Did it Again -- Jurors Continue to Improperly Use the Internet, and Courts Struggle with Solutions

All over the country, courts are struggling with how best to prevent juror communications and/or research on the Internet, including on social media such as Facebook. What's the solution? Thus far, there is no clear answer, as evidenced by a recent New Jersey case in which a juror dodged sanctions for contempt after researching a child sex-crime case involving a former pastor on the Internet -- even after being instructed to refrain from such Internet research.

In the New Jersey case, not only did the juror research certain legal terms on Wikipedia, but he also distributed handouts to his fellow jurors several days into the deliberations -- despite several precautions in place. For example, during voir dire, the court advised that the jurors should not consider facts outside of trial testimony and exhibits and similarly should not read about the case in the media. The judge also read the model jury charge each day of the trial. It reiterated that deliberations could only be based on what was presented during trial and cautioned jurors not to read about or research the case "in print, on the Internet or on any blog."

After the trial judge declared a mistrial, Bergen County Assignment Judge Peter Doyne issued an order to show cause why the juror should not be held in contempt. Judge Doyne ultimately found that a contempt sanction was not warranted because the error appeared to be a "genuine, though perhaps reckless, mistake," adding that while the conduct was contemptuous, it was not willful beyond a reasonable doubt. Judge Doyne suggested, however, that NJ's Model Jury Charges be amended "to make unquestionably clear that the prohibition on juror research and outside materials is absolute."

These steps may be necessary, as this is not the first time that jurors have engaged in improper electronic communications or research in New Jersey. In previous matters, a juror was dismissed after attempting to “friend” a defendant on Facebook and a court reversed manslaughter convictions after a juror conducted Internet research.

Recently, in addition to proposing revisions to jury instructions, other jurisdictions have attempted to employ creative means of preventing jurors from outside communications or research and/or punishing them if they disobey. For example:

Unfortunately, there is probably no cure-all solution to stop this growing problem. A recent report issued by the Federal Judicial Center last month, reinforces that challenge. At the end of the day, it is incumbent upon judges and attorneys to remain vigilant in educating jurors on what constitutes prohibited research and communications (in the traditional and cyberspace forms). Jurors should also be advised of the consequences of violating such directives.

The Fifth Annual Gibbons E-Discovery Conference Kicks Off with an Interactive and Thought-Provoking Overview of the Past Year's Pivotal E-Discovery Case Decisions

The Fifth Annual Gibbons E-Discovery Conference kicked off with an interactive overview of the important judicial decisions from 2011 that shaped and redefined the e-discovery landscape. Before an audience of general and in-house counsel, representing companies throughout the tri-state area, the esteemed panel of speakers, including Michael R. Arkfeld, Paul E. Asfendis, and Mara E. Zazzali-Hogan, moderated by Scott J. Etish, tackled the issues faced by the courts over the past year. Through a series of hypotheticals, the panelists and attendees analyzed and discussed how to handle the tough e-discovery issues that arose and how the courts’ decisions again reshaped the e-discovery landscape as we know it. Litigation hold protocols and spoliation concerns, the use of social media in discovery with its attendant ethical concerns, and the use of social media and the Internet in the courtroom were the hot topics of the day. This interactive overview of the past year’s hot button, e-discovery issues was an instant success and clearly set the tone for the remainder of the conference.

Right out of the gate, the panelists and audience examined and debated Judge Scheindlin’s aggressive litigation hold protocol set forth in Pension Committee and the ramifications and aftermath it has since had on litigants. The attendees were treated to an in-depth, interactive discussion of two critical opinions from 2010-11 decided in the Southern and Western Districts of New York. These decisions made it clear that there are other approaches to the problems raised in Pension Committee other than the “gotcha game” that has since ensued. The panelists and attendees discussed the significance of the split in authority clearly seen in Pension Committee (S.D.N.Y), Orbit One (S.D.N.Y.) and Steuben Foods, Inc. (W.D.N.Y.). The implications of whether the more liberal and practical approach found in the Orbit One and Steuben Foods decisions were also discussed at length, during which time the attendees were asked to offer their insights on whether and how they would approach their existing litigation hold protocols as a result of these recent opinions. This examination served as a perfect segue into the analysis of other key issues raised by litigation hold protocols and the production of electronic evidence, including spoliation of evidence, sanctions, and waiver of privileges by inadvertent production of data.

In addition to the considerable discussion afforded to the recent changes in the litigation hold area, the panelists next offered a thought-provoking analysis of the important developments shaping the continued evolution of e-discovery disputes stemming from discovery requests for information maintained by a litigant or witness on social media host sites. As social media has become a modern replacement for face-to-face communications, its role in the litigation of cases has increased exponentially. The panel debated the primary question of whether counsel should be afforded access to the private sections of a litigant’s Facebook, MySpace or other social media account and how the courts and local bar associations answered this question over the past year. The discussion also focused on what measures counsel can and should employ to obtain access to this private information once litigation is threatened. As the panel emphatically stressed, the past year’s decisions and bar association opinions clearly demonstrate that “friending” a litigant or using deceptive practices to gain private access is extremely risky and could result in discipline. The issue of spoliation of evidence in this context, an issue recently addressed by the District of New Jersey in Katiroll Company, Inc. was also addressed by the panel.

Before wrapping up this important roadmap to the ever increasing e-discovery issues faced by litigants and their counsel, the panel discussed and examined the challenges faced by the court with the advancements in technology and the Internet. As we are all aware, gone are the days when it took considerable time to learn about an important event or to research an issue. With the advent of smart phone devices and websites like Wikipedia, information about virtually everything is at one’s fingertips. Although extremely useful and beneficial in every day life, such instant access to information has been detrimental, at times, to the efficient administration of the law. The final hypothetical of the segment brought this very point to light when the distinguished attendees were asked to analyze what a juror did wrong when he decided to perform some research on Wikipedia regarding a critical fact of the case and then printed it out for review by his fellow jurors.

It is clear that the creation and storage of electronic data and the utilization of social media is here to stay with new advancements everyday. With these advancements, however, come new disputes and more intervention by lawyers and the courts to develop and manage methods to best keep up. It is clear that the landscape of e-discovery protocol is still unsettled with changes in methodology and philosophy popping up at a rapid pace. As the overview panel discussion made it equally clear, Gibbons is at the forefront in this area of the law and continues to strive to stay ahead for the benefit of its clients and those who may need assistance in the future.

The PowerPoint presentation that was used for this panel discussion can be found here.


Robert D. Brown, Jr. is an Associate on the Gibbons E-Discovery Task Force.

Current Cybersecurity Issues and Laws Effecting Private Sector Industries Discussed at the Fifth Annual Gibbons E-Discovery Conference

On the heels of National Cybersecurity Awareness Month in October, the second panel discussion at the Fifth Annual Gibbons E-Discovery Conference dealt with pressing issues involving cybersecurity and their effect on private industries.

Moderated by Gibbons Director and senior E-Discovery Task Force member Jeffrey L. Nagel, Esq., the panel opened with a presentation by Erez Lieberman, Esq., Deputy Chief of the Economic Crimes Unit and Chief of the Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property Section, Office of the United States Attorney, District of New Jersey. Mr. Lieberman discussed several cases of high profile cybersecurity breaches in recent years and the government’s role in those cases. Mr. Lieberman identified the various types of cybercrimes affecting businesses and provided the audience with a unique understanding of the interaction and coordination between his office, the Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, and private companies. Mr. Lieberman also addressed the effect of data breaches on the public sector and the impact of public perception on the business.

Gibbons Director Luis J. Diaz, Esq. then educated the audience on the complex patchwork of federal laws and regulations governing cybercrime, from the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to the United States Patriot Act, and provided insight into the numerous and varied state laws. Mr. Diaz discussed the potential threats to a private organization such as corporate espionage, the rising threat of malicious insiders, data hackers, and the use of spam to infiltrate company data. Mr. Diaz then discussed some of the laws intended to help prevent these illegal activities. Mr. Diaz stressed the obligations companies have regarding privacy and information security and offered a legislative overview of the relevant federal, state, and international regulations.

Concluding the discussion was Korin A. Neff, Esq., Group Vice President of Global Privacy at Windham Worldwide Corporation, who offered a first-hand perspective of the effect of cybercrime on corporations, particularly in the hospitality industry which continues to be a major target of data hackers. Ms. Neff provided a discussion of some pending legislation aimed at targeting cybercrime. She then outlined the steps corporations should take when conducting an investigation into a cyber attack, highlighted the reporting procedures a company should take when data is breached, and emphasized the need for written security policies. Ms. Neff completed her presentation with advice on the ways in which a company can protect itself from data breaches and from public fallout in the event confidential information is compromised.

The presentation that was used for this panel discussion can be found here.


Sandro G. Ocasio is an Associate on the Gibbons E-Discovery Task Force.

 

New Jersey Supreme Court Considering Guidelines Concerning Use of Electronic Devices in Courtroom

The Bench Bar Media Committee of the New Jersey Supreme Court (“Committee”) has adopted, and forwarded to the Supreme Court, Guidelines for the Usage of Electronic Devices in New Jersey state courts. The proposed Guidelines comprehensively address the use of Electronic Devices in the courtroom, the common areas of a courthouse and the grounds of a courthouse. If adopted by the Supreme Court, the proposal will represent a major revision to the existing Guidelines.

The Guidelines broadly define the term “Electronic Device” as any portable device that has the capability to broadcast, record or take photographs. Acknowledging the rapid evolution in this area, the Guidelines provide that similar devices “whether now in existence or later developed” will fall within the purview of the Guidelines.

The Guidelines then define the permitted uses of Electronic Devices on the courthouse grounds, in common areas and in the courtroom.

A. COURTHOUSE GROUNDS
The Guidelines allow virtually unrestricted use of Electronic Devices, including the use of such devices for photography, recording or broadcasting, on the grounds outside the courthouse. The only caveats are security and insuring that the utilization of such devices does not interfere with ingress and egress to and from the courthouse.

B. COMMON AREAS OF THE COURTHOUSE
While in the common areas of a courthouse, any person may possess and use an Electronic Device for any purpose other than to take photographs and/or electronically record or broadcast. Utilization of Electronic Devices in the common areas for these latter purposes requires court permission. This restriction is designed to insure that the restrictions of the Guidelines on photographing, electronically recording, and/or broadcasting in the courtroom are not circumvented by engaging in those activities immediately outside the courtroom door.

C. INSIDE THE COURTROOM
For the first time since the inception of the original Guidelines, the use of Electronic Devices (other than still cameras and television cameras) is permitted in the courtroom. The Guidelines create a distinction between the use of Electronic Devices to broadcast or photograph within a courtroom and the use of such devices for all other purposes.

Utilization of an Electronic Device for purposes other than to photograph, electronically record and/or broadcast a proceeding requires the execution of an agreement (“Agreement”) to use Electronic Devices and the filing of that Agreement with the Court. Upon execution and filing of the Agreement, which is valid for one year, the person may use an Electronic Device inside a courtroom to silently take notes and/or transcribe and receive data communications in the form of text only. In addition to the execution and filing of an Agreement, however, the individual must specifically request permission from the court. The Guidelines also continue existing restrictions on photographing, recording and/or broadcasting certain images from within a courtroom, such as jurors.

D. GENERALLY
The Guidelines further provide a mechanism for attorneys desiring to utilize an Electronic Device in a courtroom for purposes other than to photograph, electronically record and/or broadcast, to do so by annually completing the Agreement and filing same with his or her New Jersey Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection form.

Finally, in recognition that individual cases may require specific restrictions on the use of Electronic Devices, the Guidelines specifically provide that a Court retains discretion to impose such restrictions on the use of Electronic Devices necessary to implement the goals of the Guidelines, which include avoidance of interference in court proceedings and maintenance of appropriate courtroom decorum.

The Supreme Court has published for comment the proposed Guidelines which may be found on the Judiciary’s website. The comment period ends Friday, October 28, 2011. For related blog posts regarding the use of electronic devices in the courtroom, click here and here.


Thomas J. Cafferty is a Director in the Gibbons Business & Commercial Litigation Department. Nomi I. Lowy, Counsel to the Gibbons Business & Commercial Litigation Department, and Lauren James-Weir, an Associate in the Gibbons Business & Commercial Litigation Department, co-authored this post.

Caution to Anonymous Internet Posters - Your Cover Might Be Blown

Next time you consider posting something on the Internet, think again as your identity could be revealed! Under the presumed cloak of anonymity, individuals often throw caution to the wind and voice controversial and unfiltered views on the Internet. Based upon a recent ruling by an Indiana State Court in a defamation case, however, the rules of engagement on the Internet may have changed.

To advance claims of defamation field by Jeffrey Miller and his wife, Plaintiffs sought to identify anonymous Internet posters so they could include additional parties as defendants. To facilitate the identification process, Plaintiffs served subpoenas on various media outlets, including The Star, The Indianapolis Business Journal (“IBJ”) and WRTV (Channel 6) to determine the identities of individuals who criticized Mr. Miller anonymously online at those outlets’ websites. When they objected, Judge S.K. Reid ordered The Star and IBJ to turn over identifying information such as the anonymous Internet posters’ protocol addresses and/or Internet providers, which would enable Plaintiffs’ counsel to subpoena the Internet providers for the posters’ real name. On March 21, 2011, The Indianapolis Star (“The Star”) filed an appeal with the Indiana Court of Appeals to decide the question of whether Indiana’s journalism shield law and/or constitutional protections (state or federal) protect media outlets from being forced to disclose the identities of anonymous posters on their websites.

With an increasing number of defamation claims involving anonymous Internet posters, the outcome of this appeal will undoubtedly impact the manner in which Internet posters voice their opinions and/or whether websites will continue to allow individuals to post opinions anonymously. Whether you are a passionate advocate for a cause or a simple cyberbully, you should proceed with caution as your right to free speech may not be as limitless as you think. Going forward, post anonymously at your own risk because your anonymity may be a fiction.


Scott J. Etish is an Associate on the Gibbons E-Discovery Task Force.

The Gibbons E-Discovery Task Force and the NJ Chapter of Women in E-Discovery present "The Internet and Social Media in the Courtroom"

Please join the Gibbons E-Discovery Task Force and the NJ Chapter of Women in E-Discovery in its presentation of "The Internet and Social Media in the Courtroom," hosted at Gibbons on Tuesday, June 21, 2011, from 6:30 to 7:30 pm. CLE credit is available for NJ and NY, and pending for PA. Jennifer A. Hradil will moderate a panel featuring Mara E. Zazzali-Hogan, Jennifer Marino Thibodaux, and Suzanne Herrmann Brock, regarding the use of social media in litigation and the courtroom.

We will discuss how attorneys can use social media and the internet as a resource to research potential jurors and as a discovery tool to obtain potential evidence.

For additional information or to register, contact Andrea Smith at (973) 596-4451 or rsvp@gibbonslaw.com.

How Useful is Facebook's "Download Your Information" Feature in E-Discovery?

In October 2010, Facebook announced a new Download Your Information (“DYI”) feature, billed as “an easy way to quickly download to your computer everything you've ever posted on Facebook and all your correspondences with friends: your messages, wall posts, photos, status updates and profile information.” The Facebook announcement included a short video detailing how to use the feature. Cnet TV has a more in-depth video. Craig Ball also wrote an article about this feature in the February 23, 2011 issue of Law Technology News.

Introduction

The DYI feature is potentially useful to attorneys in at least two ways: preservation of their client’s electronically stored information (“ESI”) and discovery of an adversary’s ESI. If your matter involves an issue that will likely require your client to produce evidence from his or her Facebook account, it may be advisable for your client to preserve the evidence by downloading his or her Facebook information. It is generally better to err on the side of preservation than to risk the possible penalties of not preserving evidence. Read more about the risks of failing to preserve ESI here. Similarly, if you think that your adversary’s Facebook account contains ESI that may be relevant to the prosecution or defense of a claim, then it may be wise to demand that the adversary preserve that information by using the DYI feature and produce the downloaded files. But, how effective is the DYI feature as a discovery tool? And, is there any way to be sure that the adversary is not hiding any information?

Testing the DYI Feature as an E-Discovery Tool

The DYI feature rolled out to more than 500 million Facebook users over the span of a number of months. When it finally hit my account, I decided to test it out to determine its usefulness as an e-discovery tool. Being a bit of a cynic, my main concern was whether the feature archives deleted content in the event that an unscrupulous adversary intentionally deletes relevant Facebook information. Will the DYI feature uncover the deleted content? I decided to investigate.

The Approach: 1. Download, 2. Delete, 3. Re-download, 4. Compare

Step 1: I initiated the download of my Facebook information. The procedure is easy: navigate to the “Account Settings” (a.k.a. “My Account”) page from the Account drop-down menu. Then, click the “learn more” link next to “Download Your Information.” Click the green Download button, and you will receive a message advising that you will receive an email when your archive is ready to be downloaded. Once Facebook has collected your data, click the link in the email to begin the download. You will receive a condensed (.zip) file containing your photos, wall posts, events, messages, friends list, and profile information.

Step 2: After downloading my data, I deleted from my Facebook profile the following: an email message, some wall posts, comments, photos, and even a friend (not a close friend).

Step 3: Four days later, I re-downloaded my Facebook information to compare the downloaded files with the current data in my profile. It should be noted that I actually re-downloaded my information every day for four days, but only the fourth day’s download file was different than the first day’s file. In other words, Facebook did not take a fresh snapshot of my account every day - it just re-downloaded the same file three days in a row. It is unclear how often Facebook actually takes a new snapshot of a profile.

Step 4: Compare the downloaded files. Except for one email message, all of the Facebook data that I deleted between the first and last DYI files were absent from the last download file. Bothered by the email anomaly, I repeated the process and found that on the second time around, the email message disappeared from the last download file.

Conclusion

According to my test, the Facebook DYI feature gathers a user’s information as it appears in their Facebook account at the time of the initiation of the procedure. The feature does not appear to “look back” and recover deleted information in the user’s account. Thus, if a Facebook user deletes account information prior to initiating the DYI procedure, that deleted information will not appear in the downloaded file. Furthermore, the downloaded file contains no indication that data was deleted.

Based on these findings, it is inadvisable for lawyers to rely solely on the Download Your Information feature for discovery of an adversary’s Facebook information. The feature gives no assurance that a litigant’s attempt to delete evidence will be revealed. Obtaining the data directly from Facebook, for example, via subpoena, may be a better approach. The question remains, of course, whether the data produced by Facebook will include user-deleted data. According to Facebook’s Privacy Policy, “deleted information may persist in backup copies for up to 90 days,” so there is a possibility that subpoenaed data will, in fact, include relevant information.


Patrick V. DiDomenico is the Chief Knowledge Officer at Gibbons and a member of the Gibbons E-Discovery Task Force.

Court Finds Pictures Downloaded from MySpace Inadmissible

Obtaining data and images from social networking sites (“SNS”) such as Facebook, LinkedIn and MySpace has become commonplace in civil and criminal litigation. However, issues surrounding proper authentication of this information at trial remain unresolved. The New York Supreme Court’s recent opinion in People v. Karon Lenihan, 1714/2008 (Sup. Ct., Queens Cty. Nov. 12, 2010)highlights judicial skepticism surrounding the use of SNS evidence.

Karon Lenihan was convicted of second degree murder for shooting Patrick Hernandez. Before trial, Lenihan’s attorney requested, in limine, a ruling as to whether he could cross-examine two of the People’s witnesses about their alleged gang membership by using pictures Lenihan’s mother downloaded from MySpace four days after the shooting. Lenihan alleged the photographs showed the witnesses making hand signs and wearing clothing that signified an affiliation with the Crips gang, and that the witnesses’ gang affiliation was a possible motive for them to fabricate their story and frame Lenihan. The court denied Lenihan’s motion and affirmed its decision in a written opinion on Lenihan’s post trial motion to set aside the verdict. The judge set forth several grounds for barring the pictures downloaded from MySpace, including questions regarding authenticity. Specifically, the Court held as follows:

In light of the ability to ‘photo shop,’ edit photographs on the computer, defendant could not authenticate the photographs.

The court also noted that the Lenihan did not know who took the photographs or who posted them to MySpace.

Based on the court’s ruling in Lenihan, it would be difficult for a party to authenticate a photograph or image downloaded from a SNS without first obtaining a statement or affidavit from an individual with personal knowledge as to when the original photograph was taken and that the downloaded photograph is an accurate representation of the original. However, not all courts that have addressed this issue have imposed such an onerous burden to authenticate SNS and website images. For example, in Toytrackerz LLC v. Koehler, Case No. 08-2297 (GLR), 2009 WL 2591329 (D. Kan. Aug. 21, 2009) the court noted that an image printed from a website could be authenticated by testimony from the person who printed the image that the image “accurately reflects the content of the website and the image of the page on the computer at which the printout was made.” Likewise, in kSolo, Inc. v. Catona, Case Nos. 07-5213, 08-1801 (CAS) (AGRx), 2008 WL 4906115, n.5 (C.D. Cal Nov. 10, 2008), the court admitted screenshots from a website that were accompanied by a declaration from the individual who created the screenshots attesting that the “screenshots are an accurate representation of what he encountered upon visiting the website.” Thus, litigants who intend to use SNS images in support of their case should be mindful that case law regarding the authentication of SNS images is not settled and continues to evolve.

Further discussion of the admissibility of website images can be found here.


Suzanne Herrmann Brock is an Associate on the Gibbons E-Discovery Task Force.

Internet File Sharing Constitutes Distribution in Child Porn Case

New Jersey’s Appellate Division recently held in State v. Lyons, __ N.J. Super. __, 2010 N.J. Super. LEXIS 227 (App. Div. Nov. 30, 2010) that Defendant Richard Lyons’ placement of child pornography in a shared online folder constituted an offer and distribution of child pornography in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(5)(a). Lyons’ computers contained videos of children engaged in sexual activities, including one that a detective discovered and downloaded when he accessed a shared folder on Gnutella, a peer-to-peer file sharing network, accessible via LimeWire software program. In his statement to police, Lyons admitted that he:

  • was very familiar with computers and the Internet;
  • understood that the file-sharing program LimeWire would result in any file he downloaded going into a shared folder for others to obtain;
  • knew he could have changed LimeWire’s default setting so that sharing was not the default, but he “just forgot;” and
  • knew that possessing, viewing and distributing pictures or videos of children under the age of sixteen constituted a crime.

The Appellate Division framed the question before it, which had never been addressed in a New Jersey published opinion, as follows: “[W]hether the State presented some evidence to the grand jury that defendant knowingly committed at least one of the statutorily prohibited actions with the material on his computer as charged in each count.” In analyzing this novel question, the court examined the genesis of the child pornography statute, noting that in the past fifteen years the statute has been amended to include “computer programs” and “computer files” in the list of prohibited materials and to include the “Internet” as a prohibited means of distributing such illegal materials. The court also examined the relevant portion of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(5)(a), which makes it a second-degree crime to “knowingly” give, provide, publish, distribute, disseminate or offer “through any means, including the Internet” any “photograph, film, videotape, computer program or file” of a child engaged in a prohibited sexual act.

Reversing the trial court’s dismissal of two counts of the indictment, the Appellate Division rejected Lyons’ arguments that (1) he did not knowingly violate the statute because he claimed he had not engaged in any “overt actions” in furtherance of the illegal activity and (2) his failure to change the default settings on his computer was a “mere omission” devoid of any criminal intent. The Appellate Division determined that Lyons had the requisite “knowing” mental state as defined by N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(2), which equates knowledge with awareness of the existence or probability of circumstances or an awareness that it is “practically certain” that specific conduct will cause a specific result. According to the court, Lyons acted with “complete awareness” that the materials in his LimeWire shared folder were available to “all other users of the network” as well as with the “awareness” of the “practical certainty” that his conduct would “result in another user viewing and downloading his materials,” and thus the court rejected any distinction between active and passive conduct with respect to providing access to contraband.

Lyons is significant because it demonstrates that one cannot hide behind “shared files” or “default settings” to escape liability when a criminal statute prohibits knowing acts that relate to distribution of prohibited materials or things. After Lyons, passive conduct or default settings cannot constitute a defense from liability where it is the result of knowing neglect or knowing disregard of the technicalities of file sharing.

For a related article regarding “cached” web files serving as evidence in a New York child pornography case, the reader is referred to "Cached" Web Files May Serve as Evidence in Child Pornography Case, E-Discovery Law Alert, November 22, 2010.

"Cached" Web Files May Serve as Evidence in Child Pornography Case

In a prosecution for promoting and possessing computer images of child pornography, a Brooklyn appellate panel upheld the conviction of defendant and determined that temporary files automatically “cached” by an internet browser may serve as evidence of promoting and possessing child pornography. People v. Kent, ___ A.D.3d ___, 2010 N.Y. Slip. Op. 7364, 2010 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7405 (App. Div. 2d Dept. Oct. 12, 2010). The defendant, a professor of public administration at a Dutchess County college, was found guilty of 134 counts of possession of a sexual performance and 2 counts of promotion related to his use of an office computer.

Defendant’s improper use of his office computer came to light after he complained about his computer. An employee of the college’s IT department ran a virus scan and discovered a “work” folder containing a large number of images of young girls. The employee removed the hard drive, and the college turned it over to the Police Department of the Town of Poughkeepsie. An investigator on behalf of the Town of Poughkeepsie found that defendant was the only active account user associated with the hard drive, and that there was no evidence that any other user had logged onto the computer, other than IT personnel through an “administrator” account.

The investigation further revealed that defendant had created an alternate profile named “Jim” to access the internet via Mozilla Firefox, and that he had used this alternate profile to access child pornography. Under the “Jim” profile, there was a temporary internet file known as the Web “cache,” an automatic storage mechanism designed to quickly display previously visited web pages. Defendant’s hard drive also contained a trail related to the preferences for the “Jim” profile, which automatically placed any downloaded material into the “work” folder and links to video files that had been played via the Real Player program.

Justice Daniel D. Angiolillo, writing for the unanimous panel, explained that “the mere existence of an image automatically stored in the cache, standing alone, is legally insufficient to prove either procurement or knowing possession of child pornography.” However, in light of the evidence obtained from the defendant’s hard drive, particularly the pattern of internet browsing established under the “Jim” profile, the Court found that “[t]he evidence in totality was legally sufficient to establish that the defendant, ‘knowing the character and content’ of the material, knowingly procured the [cached] Web page for his personal consumption.”


Scott J. Etish is an Associate on the Gibbons E-Discovery Task Force.

Accessing an Adversary's Public Social Networking Information -- N.Y. Professional Ethics Opinion 843

Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn and MySpace are among the top social media websites that have culturally transformed electronic communications and social interactions. Inevitably, these platforms have also affected litigation practice and present myriad ethical dilemmas. One such dilemma is whether an attorney can access an adverse party’s social networking website to obtain information about the party, including impeachment material.

In Professional Ethics Opinion 843, issued on September 10, 2010, the New York State Bar Association's Committee on Professional Ethics concluded that an attorney representing a party in pending litigation may access the public pages of another party's social networking website to obtain publicly available information about that party. The Committee observed that some social networking websites and/or users do not require pre-approval or consent to access member profiles, and thus the profiles are accessible to all members. While the Committee found that such information on social networking websites is akin to publicly accessible online or print media, it also made clear that there are limitations to the attorney’s conduct on social networking sites:

  • An attorney cannot “friend” or otherwise make contact with the party. Such conduct would fall within the purview of Rule 4.2 of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct (“Rules”), which prohibits a lawyer from communicating with the represented party about the subject of the representation absent prior consent from the represented party’s lawyer.
  • An attorney cannot employ a third party to “friend” the party. Such conduct would fall within the purview of Rule 8.4(c), which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving “dishonesty, fraud, deceit or mispresentation;” Rule 4.1, which prohibits lawyers from making false statements of fact or law to a third person; and Rule 5.3(b)(1), which holds an attorney responsible for the conduct of employed non-attorneys who violated the Rules.

In short, the rule is you may look, but do not “friend.”


Robert D. Brown, Jr. is an Associate on the Gibbons E-Discovery Task Force.

NJ Courts Allow Internet Usage in Court

Imagine you are in a New Jersey courtroom and have begun the jury selection process. When presented with one of the prospective jurors, you think that you have read about him or her in a recent article. As a result, you open your laptop and begin to surf the Internet to research the individual, but your adversary objects, stating that he or she does not have a computer. Will the judge rule in your favor? The answer is “yes” based upon the Appellate Division’s recent opinion in Carino v. Muenzen, 2010 N.J. Super Unpub. LEXIS 2154 (App. Div. Aug. 30, 2010).

In Carino, the Appellate Division overruled a trial judge’s decision that barred an attorney from using a computer to Google potential jurors during the jury selection process. There, the trial court discovered through defense counsel’s objection that plaintiff’s counsel was accessing the Internet to Google prospective jurors. Subsequently, the trial court found that plaintiff’s counsel’s use of the Internet provided him with an “inherent advantage” during the jury selection process that resulted in an uneven playing field because he had failed to provide notice to his adversary that he intended to use the laptop for that purpose.

The Appellate Division, however, disagreed, noting that whether an attorney can access the Internet while in the courtroom is not addressed in the Rules of Court. The court also declined to uphold the trial judge’s decision because the judge had not cited any authority that imposes an affirmative obligation on an attorney to notify an adversary of an intention to use the Internet during any trial proceeding. The Appellate Division also relied upon the fact that the vicinage or county where the trial was venued had issued a press release approximately one year earlier announcing the arrival of wireless Internet access in that courthouse “to maximize productivity for attorneys” and other court users. As noted by the appellate court, nothing in that press release, however, referenced a requirement that notice be given to an adversary in advance of accessing the Internet.

Although the appellate panel acknowledged that a trial judge is normally given great deference in managing the courtroom, it concluded that there was no reasonable basis for the trial judge to prohibit Internet access. In fact, the Appellate Division noted that there was nothing disruptive about the attorney attempting to do so and that there was no unfair advantage to defense counsel because both attorneys could have utilized Internet access if they so chose. Therefore, in New Jersey, absent promulgation of a court rule that dictates the contrary, there is no notice requirement -- let alone any prohibition -- regarding attorneys accessing the Internet while in the courtroom.