Use of Work Computer Results in Waiver of Marital Communication Privilege

In U.S. v. Hamilton, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that a husband who sent messages from his work email account to his wife, yet took no steps to protect the sanctity of those emails, waived the marital communications privilege, thus subjecting the emails to disclosure during discovery. This case serves as an important reminder that employees do not necessarily enjoy an expectation of privacy in the emails they send from their work accounts or while using their employers’ computers.

The defendant in Hamilton, who was a state legislator and simultaneously worked for a public school system, was convicted of bribery and extortion. The defendant’s trouble came when he provided legislative assistance to a university in exchange for employment. In the time between his initial meetings with university officials and the employment offer, the defendant exchanged emails with his wife regarding their financial situation and the salary he sought from the university. In that same time span, the defendant also exchanged emails with a dean of the university pertaining to his potential employment and legislation he would initiate that would be favorable to the university. All of these emails were sent to or from the defendant’s workplace computer through his work email account.

On appeal, the defendant argued that the Trial Court erred by admitting into evidence incriminating emails he had sent to his wife. The defendant claimed that the marital communications privilege, which generally provides that private communications between spouses are confidential, protected the emails from disclosure. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, relying in large part on the employer’s written computer policy. The policy stated that employees had “no expectation of privacy in their use of the Computer System” and that all information “created, sent, received, accessed, or stored . . . [was] subject to inspection and monitoring.” Although the defendant argued that the emails were sent before the computer policy was enacted, the Court found that he waived the marital communications privilege because he took no steps to protect the previous emails even after the computer policy was enacted.

Even though Hamilton is not binding outside the Fourth Circuit, the opinion may nonetheless be viewed as conflicting with governing law in other states, including New Jersey. As readers of this blog may recall from our prior discussion of the decision in Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that an employee’s emails with her attorney, though sent from her work computer, were protected by the attorney-client privilege and therefore did not have to be disclosed to her employer, whom she accused of discrimination. The Stengart decision may, however, be distinguished from Hamilton on several grounds. First, unlike the emails in Hamilton that were sent from the defendant’s workplace computer through his work email account, the emails in Stengart were sent from a personal, web-based, password-protected email account. Second, in contrast to the clear “no expectation of privacy” policy in Hamilton, the employer’s policy in Stengart regarding personal email accounts was obscure. Finally, the privileges at issue were different. In Stengart, the New Jersey Supreme Court opined that the public interest in attorney-client privilege is of such importance that waiver should not easily be inferred. It is possible that the New Jersey Supreme Court might not accord the marital privilege the same level of sanctity. In any event, although the Hamilton and Stengart courts reached what may be viewed as divergent conclusions, both sought to balance the terms of the employer’s policy with efforts by the employee to maintain privacy, in addition to affording deference to traditionally privileged communications, such as those between attorney and client or husband and wife.

With the proliferation of personal devices, such as smart phones and tablets, employers and employees should be aware that communication privileges can be waived when sent through non-protected media. To avoid confusion, employers ought to have in place clear, comprehensive information technology policies. Employers should also consider encouraging their employees to engage in personal communications using only personal devices rather than employer-owned equipment. If employers are successful in convincing their employees to abide by clear information technology policies, they will reduce confusion in the workplace and avoid discovery disputes in the event that litigation between employer and employee unfortunately comes to fruition.


Kevin G. Walsh is a Director in the Gibbons Business & Commercial Litigation Department. Marc D. Bianchi, an Associate in the Gibbons Business & Commercial Litigation Department, co-authored this post.

New Jersey Supreme Court Considering Guidelines Concerning Use of Electronic Devices in Courtroom

The Bench Bar Media Committee of the New Jersey Supreme Court (“Committee”) has adopted, and forwarded to the Supreme Court, Guidelines for the Usage of Electronic Devices in New Jersey state courts. The proposed Guidelines comprehensively address the use of Electronic Devices in the courtroom, the common areas of a courthouse and the grounds of a courthouse. If adopted by the Supreme Court, the proposal will represent a major revision to the existing Guidelines.

The Guidelines broadly define the term “Electronic Device” as any portable device that has the capability to broadcast, record or take photographs. Acknowledging the rapid evolution in this area, the Guidelines provide that similar devices “whether now in existence or later developed” will fall within the purview of the Guidelines.

The Guidelines then define the permitted uses of Electronic Devices on the courthouse grounds, in common areas and in the courtroom.

A. COURTHOUSE GROUNDS
The Guidelines allow virtually unrestricted use of Electronic Devices, including the use of such devices for photography, recording or broadcasting, on the grounds outside the courthouse. The only caveats are security and insuring that the utilization of such devices does not interfere with ingress and egress to and from the courthouse.

B. COMMON AREAS OF THE COURTHOUSE
While in the common areas of a courthouse, any person may possess and use an Electronic Device for any purpose other than to take photographs and/or electronically record or broadcast. Utilization of Electronic Devices in the common areas for these latter purposes requires court permission. This restriction is designed to insure that the restrictions of the Guidelines on photographing, electronically recording, and/or broadcasting in the courtroom are not circumvented by engaging in those activities immediately outside the courtroom door.

C. INSIDE THE COURTROOM
For the first time since the inception of the original Guidelines, the use of Electronic Devices (other than still cameras and television cameras) is permitted in the courtroom. The Guidelines create a distinction between the use of Electronic Devices to broadcast or photograph within a courtroom and the use of such devices for all other purposes.

Utilization of an Electronic Device for purposes other than to photograph, electronically record and/or broadcast a proceeding requires the execution of an agreement (“Agreement”) to use Electronic Devices and the filing of that Agreement with the Court. Upon execution and filing of the Agreement, which is valid for one year, the person may use an Electronic Device inside a courtroom to silently take notes and/or transcribe and receive data communications in the form of text only. In addition to the execution and filing of an Agreement, however, the individual must specifically request permission from the court. The Guidelines also continue existing restrictions on photographing, recording and/or broadcasting certain images from within a courtroom, such as jurors.

D. GENERALLY
The Guidelines further provide a mechanism for attorneys desiring to utilize an Electronic Device in a courtroom for purposes other than to photograph, electronically record and/or broadcast, to do so by annually completing the Agreement and filing same with his or her New Jersey Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection form.

Finally, in recognition that individual cases may require specific restrictions on the use of Electronic Devices, the Guidelines specifically provide that a Court retains discretion to impose such restrictions on the use of Electronic Devices necessary to implement the goals of the Guidelines, which include avoidance of interference in court proceedings and maintenance of appropriate courtroom decorum.

The Supreme Court has published for comment the proposed Guidelines which may be found on the Judiciary’s website. The comment period ends Friday, October 28, 2011. For related blog posts regarding the use of electronic devices in the courtroom, click here and here.


Thomas J. Cafferty is a Director in the Gibbons Business & Commercial Litigation Department. Nomi I. Lowy, Counsel to the Gibbons Business & Commercial Litigation Department, and Lauren James-Weir, an Associate in the Gibbons Business & Commercial Litigation Department, co-authored this post.

Orbit One: Inadequate ESI Preservation Does Not Merit Sanctions Absent Evidence That Relevant Information Has Been Destroyed

Orbit One Communications, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 2010 WL 4615547 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2010) represents a dichotomy in jurisprudence on ESI preservation efforts and the imposition of automatic sanctions. In Orbit One, Magistrate Judge James C. Francis, IV found that regardless of how inadequate a litigant’s preservation efforts may be, sanctions are not appropriate without proof that “information of significance” has been lost. The court determined that the threshold determination must be “whether any material that has been destroyed was likely relevant even for purposes of discovery.” In so holding, the court discussed and diverged from Judge Shira A. Scheindlin’s decision in Pension Committee of the University of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of America Securities, LLC, which earlier held that sanctions may be warranted for inadequate preservation efforts even if no relevant evidence is lost. 685 F. Supp.2d 456, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).

In Orbit One, defendant Numerex acquired substantially all of Orbit One’s assets through an asset purchase agreement. Numerex also entered into employment agreements with Orbit One principals and David Ronsen, the founder of Orbit One. Shortly thereafter, Orbit One’s sales became poor and revenues were not meeting projections. On January 7, 2008, Ronsen commenced litigation against Numerex. During discovery, Orbit One’s information technology (“IT”) administrator Christopher Dingman disclosed that he was not informed of the litigation hold regarding the Numerex litigation (or of a litigation hold regarding an earlier instituted matter) and that certain actions taken by him and at Ronsen’s direction resulted in the loss of ESI data from Ronsen’s desktop computer, laptop and email account. Upon discovery that information had been deleted and removed, Numerex sought an adverse jury instruction against Orbit One and Ronsen on the ground that these parties are responsible for the spoliation of electronically stored information.

Judge Francis itemized the instances where Orbit One and Ronsen failed to adopt and implement model preservation procedures, but also observed that the data on Ronsen’s laptop, hard drive, backup disks and email account either had been archived, was uncompromised, was otherwise still retrievable and/or had actually been previously produced. As such, the court concluded that sanctions, particularly the severe sanction of an adverse inference, was not appropriate because there was insufficient evidence that any of Orbit One and Ronsen’s actions resulted in the loss of any “discovery-relevant” information -- information that is likely relevant even if only under the broad definition of the Federal Rules. The court noted that sanctions, particularly in the form of an adverse inference, are predicated on the loss of information that is “relevant” to a claim or defense and to “ameliorate any prejudice to the innocent party by filling the evidentiary gap created by the party that destroyed evidence.” Accordingly, the sanction of an adverse inference for inadequate preservation efforts must be tied to a showing of the loss of “discovery-relevant” materials and prejudice to the innocent party, not simply to the spoliating party’s gross negligence or bad faith. Magistrate Judge Francis took issue with Pension Committee for its omission of the discovery-relevance requirement and for the suggestion that sanctions are warranted by a mere showing that a party’s preservation efforts were inadequate. Under that standard, the court reasoned that litigation would become a “gotcha” game between the parties regarding lost information, however inconsequential, rather than a full and fair opportunity to address the merits of a dispute. Thus, Magistrate Judge Francis held that sanctions are only appropriate if the inadequate preservation efforts resulted in the destruction of “discovery-relevant” materials.

The law on sanctions, spoliation and preservation efforts favors a factored analysis approach to the imposition of sanctions, rather than a categorical approach that ignores culpability or the lack of any real damage to the innocent party. Thus, most courts have held that sanctions for the destruction of ESI data should be dictated by circumstances of individual cases and should only be imposed if discovery relevant material has been destroyed. Nonetheless, this contrast of opinions between two highly respected jurists and e-discovery specialists from the same jurisdiction highlights the controversial and constantly evolving nature of these principles, and cautions that the most prudent course is to always engage in broad, methodical and well-documented preservation practices.

NJ Courts Allow Internet Usage in Court

Imagine you are in a New Jersey courtroom and have begun the jury selection process. When presented with one of the prospective jurors, you think that you have read about him or her in a recent article. As a result, you open your laptop and begin to surf the Internet to research the individual, but your adversary objects, stating that he or she does not have a computer. Will the judge rule in your favor? The answer is “yes” based upon the Appellate Division’s recent opinion in Carino v. Muenzen, 2010 N.J. Super Unpub. LEXIS 2154 (App. Div. Aug. 30, 2010).

In Carino, the Appellate Division overruled a trial judge’s decision that barred an attorney from using a computer to Google potential jurors during the jury selection process. There, the trial court discovered through defense counsel’s objection that plaintiff’s counsel was accessing the Internet to Google prospective jurors. Subsequently, the trial court found that plaintiff’s counsel’s use of the Internet provided him with an “inherent advantage” during the jury selection process that resulted in an uneven playing field because he had failed to provide notice to his adversary that he intended to use the laptop for that purpose.

The Appellate Division, however, disagreed, noting that whether an attorney can access the Internet while in the courtroom is not addressed in the Rules of Court. The court also declined to uphold the trial judge’s decision because the judge had not cited any authority that imposes an affirmative obligation on an attorney to notify an adversary of an intention to use the Internet during any trial proceeding. The Appellate Division also relied upon the fact that the vicinage or county where the trial was venued had issued a press release approximately one year earlier announcing the arrival of wireless Internet access in that courthouse “to maximize productivity for attorneys” and other court users. As noted by the appellate court, nothing in that press release, however, referenced a requirement that notice be given to an adversary in advance of accessing the Internet.

Although the appellate panel acknowledged that a trial judge is normally given great deference in managing the courtroom, it concluded that there was no reasonable basis for the trial judge to prohibit Internet access. In fact, the Appellate Division noted that there was nothing disruptive about the attorney attempting to do so and that there was no unfair advantage to defense counsel because both attorneys could have utilized Internet access if they so chose. Therefore, in New Jersey, absent promulgation of a court rule that dictates the contrary, there is no notice requirement -- let alone any prohibition -- regarding attorneys accessing the Internet while in the courtroom.